Ukraine is important to world energy markets because it is
a critical transit center for exports of Russian oil and natural
gas to Eastern and Western Europe, as well as a major energy producer
and consumer in its own right.
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GENERAL BACKGROUND
The state of Ukraine's economy continues to be one of the most important issues for this relatively young nation. Almost six years after independence, Ukraine is still struggling to convert its old Soviet style economy to a more market oriented, western style economy. From 1991 to 1995 Ukraine's economy suffered declines in real GDP of more than 10% each year. But, this decline slowed slightly in 1996 to 10% and is expected to slow to 5% for 1997. Some analysts project GDP to begin growing moderately starting in 1998. However, political conflicts between the Kuchma administration and the parliament over economic reforms stalled the economic recovery process. As of May 1997, the parliament had failed to pass the 1997 budget and to enact an economic reform package first unveiled in December 1996. The reform legislation includes tax reform, deregulation, sound fiscal policy, and a variety of financial and structural reforms. These conflicts have jeopardized bank loans and foreign investments designed to assist Ukraine's ailing economy. GDP for 1997 is now projected to fall 5%, but if the Kuchma administration and parliament reach an agreement on these economic reforms, Ukraine's economy could experience sustained growth starting in 1998.
Ukraine's relations
with its largest and perhaps most important neighbor Russia, is
always an important issue. In some ways Ukraine has a mutually
beneficial relationship with Russia. For example, while Ukraine
may depend heavily on Russian oil and gas exports, Russia relies
on Ukrainian pipelines for 95% of its gas exports to Europe. Despite
this mutual dependence, relations with Russia often turn contentious.
At times, Ukraine has used Russian dependence on its pipelines
as a bargaining tool to extract higher transit fees while Russia
has accused Ukraine of removing transit supplies.
In an attempt to decrease its dependence on Russian exports, Ukraine is actively seeking foreign investment in its oil and gas industries to increase domestic production of energy resources and to develop methods of bypassing Russian pipelines. Ukraine produces only a small percentage of the oil and gas it needs every year and relies heavily on imports especially from Russia. Since joining the World Bank in 1992, Ukraine has received loans for twelve projects, four of which were for the energy sector: a $114 million loan to rehabilitate hydro plants, a $317 million loan to support electricity marketing improvements, a $15.8 million coal pilot project loan, and a $300 million coal sector adjustment loan. The State Statistics Committee reported in August 1997 that for the first half of 1997 foreign investment was up 75% as compared to the same period for 1996 attracting $335.5 million. It brought the total direct foreign investment in Ukraine to $1.65 billion. The Committee also reported that, since Ukrainian independence, 19% of the total foreign investment came from the United States, followed by Germany at 10%, the Netherlands at 9.7%, Britain at 7.9%, and Russia at nearly 7%.
The key to attracting foreign investors is Ukraine's
privatization program for its energy industries. Although progress
has been made, many obstacles remain. Valuing Ukrainian enterprises
is nearly impossible. The Ukrainian constitution guarantees private
ownership but still prohibits foreigners from buying land. Acquiring
a controlling block of shares has proved difficult for foreign
investors because many companies have already sold large packages
of shares to workers, local residents, and trust funds. Share
holders such as workers tend to block restructuring, and trust
fund shares are sold at much higher prices than their normal value.
Finally, conflicts between the president, the prime minister and
parliament and other internal political conflicts have caused
significant delays in instituting the economic reforms needed
for the privatization process to move forward. In the last year,
Viktor Pynzenyk, Ukraine's
top economic reformer, resigned over budget battles with parliament
and President Kuchma removed from office Bohdan Babiy, head of
the state oil and gas committee, and Viktor Chebrov, head of the
Derzhkomatom nuclear body for failing to fulfill their duties.
In addition, Prime Minister Lazarenko continued to be plagued
by accusations that he improperly helped United Energy Systems
dominate the sale of natural gas in Ukraine as part of a gas trading
plan that granted rights to import and distribute gas to a handful
of well-connected companies. Lazarenko eventually resigned under
pressure in July 1997 and was replaced by Valery Pustovoitenko.
OIL
Ukraine's oil industry
continues to rely heavily on Russian oil exports. At times, Ukraine's
ability to pay for these supplies has been limited resulting in
huge debts. In 1994, Russia began limiting oil shipments to Ukraine
because of these debts, and as partial payment, Ukraine gave Russia
a 30% stake in Ukrneftegaz. In October 1994, Ukraine and Russia
negotiated a friendship treaty which increased Russian oil exports
to Ukraine to 400,000 b/d.
Russian oil is also a source of revenue for Ukraine. Large portions
of Russian pipelines run through Ukrainian territory and Ukraine
charges tariffs for their use. In 1996, Ukraine increased Russia's
oil transit tariff from $4.50 to $5.20 per metric ton. For 1996,
Russia paid Ukraine $200 million in oil transit fees, $75 million
on the Dnieper pipeline, and $125 million on the Druzhba (Friendship)
pipeline. However, Ukraine announced in June 1997 that it would
not increase tariffs on Russian oil being transported through
the Druzhba export pipeline. Meanwhile, Russian oil companies
are considering construction of a new 155 mile eastern branch
of the Perm-Saratov-Novorossiisk pipeline in order to avoid transporting
oil through Ukrainian pipelines and paying transit fees. In addition,
Lukoil, one of Russia's
largest oil companies, announced in January 1997 that it was considering
buying shares in three Ukrainian oil refineries located in Drogobych,
Kherson, and Odessa. In July 1997, Russia's
Rosneft announced that it would bid for a 45% stake in the ailing
Lisichansk refinery. In return for the sell off, Ukraine required
promises from potential bidders to repay the refinery's
$230 million debt and guarantee annual crude deliveries of 120,000
b/d over the next seven years.
Over the last year, Ukraine also took steps towards reducing its
dependence on Russian oil exports. In January 1997, a Black Sea
ferry link opened between Georgia and Ukraine. It represented
a first step towards opening a transport corridor for oil from
Azerbaijan to Ukraine. Ukraine has long term plans to build an
oil pipeline to connect the Black Sea port of Odessa with the
Druzhba export pipeline. The plan also includes an additional
oil terminal in Odessa. The system would allow Ukraine to supply
local refineries with oil coming from Azerbaijan via Georgian
ports and the Black Sea or Mediterranean region. About 62 miles
of the 500-mile pipeline has already been completed with a total
cost estimated at $400 million. To cover the cost, Ukraine will
invest $200 million itself and is seeking a $200 million loan
from a foreign bank to make up the difference. In June 1997, Ukraine
signed an agreement with Turkey to build a 350-mile pipeline from
the Turkish port of Ceyhan to the port of Samson on the Black
Sea coast. The joint venture would build a pipeline with an initial
capacity of 800,000 b/d carrying crude oil from Iraq, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia to a new loading terminal at Samsun. The oil would
then be shipped to a new import terminal at Odessa for distribution
to Ukrainian refineries and the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline.
Ukraine is also looking to further develop its own oil reserves
and production through foreign investments. Several foreign oil
companies have shown significant interest in Ukraine's
oil industry. Shell announced in January 1997 that it was making
progress in talks with the Ukrainian government over Black Sea
oil reserves exploration. The company may invest up to $1 billion
in natural gas pipeline and oil drilling projects. In June 1997,
Houston-based Fountain Oil Inc. announced that it was acquiring
a license to pursue a second Ukrainian exploration and drilling
project in the Stynawske oil field. The project is a joint venture
with Ukraine National Oil Co. (Ukranafta) and Fountain will have
a 45% share in any oil sold from the Stynawske oil field. As of
June 1997, Fountain invested $1.6 million in Stynawske and planned
to invest an additional $11 million. Drilling is expected to begin
in late 1997. Currently, Stynawske's
wells are producing 280 b/d, but Fountain is hoping for much higher
oil production. Fountain already owns a 40.5% interest in a joint
venture with Ukranafta to redevelop the Lelyaki field near Kiev.
In addition, two Canadian companies, Odyssey Petroleum Corp. and
Trident Exploration Ltd., announced plans to further develop the
Dolina oil field, located in western Ukraine, in a joint venture
with Ukranafta. The field yields 4,000 b/d and the companies project
an increase production to about 40,000 b/d. The companies plan
to start the project in the summer of 1997.
Privatization of Ukrainian Oil Refining
As part of its plan to increase domestic oil production, Ukraine
embarked on an extensive privatization program for its oil industry.
Ukrainian efforts towards privatization began in 1992, but over
the last five years the oil industry remained virtually untouched.
Oil companies were converted into state-owned joint-stock companies,
but further attempts at reform did not occur until this year.
The Ukrainian government has now adopted an individualized approach
to privatization for each sector of the economy. The oil refining
sector is currently in the process of privatization with five
of the six refineries already in private hands. In a program developed
by the State Property Fund of Ukraine, (SPF) each refinery has
its own privatization plan with the distribution of shares varying
from refinery to refinery. The plans share four characteristics:
preferential subscription to employees in which shares are purchased
either with cash or privatization certificates (PCS) at their
normal value, sales to financial intermediaries and Ukrainian
citizens for PCS and compensation certificates (CCs) in special
monthly PC and CC auctions, investment tenders for strategic investors
for cash, and state ownership of between 14 percent and 33 percent.
Most shares have been distributed for PCS and CCs with little
cash being invested in the refineries. The Neftekhimik Prikarpatya
refinery (formally Nadvirna refinery) has undergone the most privatization
with over 40 percent of shares already distributed. The Galychina
refinery (formally Dogobych refinery) is next with almost 40 percent
of shares distributed followed by the Lysychansk refinery at roughly
25 percent, the Kherson refinery at 24 percent, and the Odessa
refinery at about 20 percent. The Kremenchug refinery has not
begun the process of privatization and remains a closed joint-stock
company.
NATURAL GAS
Ukraine's gas industry
continues to be plagued by huge debts caused mostly by unpaid
gas bills. Ukrainian gas consumers have run up billions of dollars
worth of debt with the help of lax controls on non-paying customers
and government subsidies for domestic consumption. This left the
country's gas suppliers
without money to pay for imports. In an attempt to alleviate the
debts, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a resolution which allowed
gas companies to cut off gas supplies to companies and individuals
who refused to pay their bills. The resolution also ordered debtors
to pay off outstanding debts by October 1, 1997.
Ukraine's gas industry
relies heavily on gas imports, primarily from Russia and Turkmenistan.
In recent years, both countries have halted and reduced gas supplies
due to Ukraine's inability
to pay off large debts, but recently some progress has been made.
In May 1997, Ukraine reportedly paid off 90% of its 1996 gas debt
owed to the Russian gas company Gazprom. In addition, Ukraine
confirmed that it agreed to pay a $302 million debt for supplies
of natural gas from Turkmenistan for 1996 and the first four months
of 1997.
However, in July 1997, Gazprom reduced gas deliveries to Ukraine
by 1 bcf in an attempt to force the Ukrainian government to pay
off an outstanding $100 million debt. United Energy Systems and
Intergaz, Ukraine's
two leading gas distributors, owed Gazprom up to $150 million.
Turkmenistan had also cut off gas supplies to the Ukraine due
to unpaid debts of $200 million dollars. Ukraine and Turkmenistan
brokered a deal to satisfy the debt in May 1997 where Ukraine
would receive up to 700 bcf/yr of natural gas from Turkmenistan
in exchange for Ukrainian goods and services in addition to partial
payment in hard currency. The agreement also changed the delivery
terms where Ukraine would purchase gas at the Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan border. Ukrgaz would then ship it across Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Russia. However, the deal crumbled by mid-May
over a $205 million debt owed to Turkmenistan by gas trader Itera.
In late 1996, Ukraine and Russia signed contracts for supplying
natural gas to Ukraine for 1997. Russia is expected to deliver
nearly 1.9 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 1997 including 1.06 Tcf
as a payment for gas transit via Ukraine. Russia is also expected
to send 4.6 Tcf across Ukraine in 1997. Ukraine is expected to
produce 530 bcf of indigenous natural gas in 1997. Concurrently,
negotiations between the two countries continues regarding a joint
venture to construct the Torzhok-Dolina pipeline. The main purpose
of the proposed pipeline is to increase the flow of Russian transit
gas.
Despite the huge debts, Ukraine continued attempts at developing
and reforming its gas industry. In early 1997, the Ukrainian government
created a Ukrainian gas resources consortium. The consortium is
designed to provide mutual settlements for gas consumed, transport
services, and improvement of gas supplied to consumers. In June
1997, the United Kiev Resources reported on the Rudovsko-Krasnozavodskoye
gas condensate field, the largest but not fully developed onshore
gas field in Ukraine. United Kiev with its Ukrainian partner Poltavaneftegaz,
a subsidiary of the Joint Stock Company, Ukrnafta, the Ukrainian
State Oil Producing Enterprise, began drilling five development
wells in the most prolific part of the field. The company had
already made significant progress on all five of the wells and
expected to reach targeted depths in four by the end of fall 1997
and by January 1998 in the fifth. In addition, United Energy Systems
of Ukraine, which supplies nearly a third of Ukraine's
gas market, announced plans to extend gas pipelines serving Ukrainian
and Russian gas shipments to Europe.
As for foreign investments, Ukraine's
gas industry endured some gains and losses. In January 1997, Marathon
announced that it had pulled out of Ukraine where it had plans
to invest up to $200 million in exploring the Poltava natural
gas field. Marathon cited unanswered questions surrounding issues
such as licensing, gas marketing, security of investment, and
tax and legal stability, although it did not rule out the possibility
of returning if these issues were resolved. However, also in January
1997, Ukraine received almost $80 million in financing from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to install one
million gas meters. The goal of the project is to promote more
efficient use of gas, improve energy conservation, and provide
a basis for private initiative in the Ukrainian gas sector. In
May 1997, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and President Leonid Kuchma
signed a joint initiative to develop Ukraine's
gas sector. U.S. Vice President Gore also indicated that the administration
would eliminate the annual congressional review of Ukraine's
most-favored-nation trade status giving Ukraine more secure access
to U.S. markets. Moreover, in June 1997, TransCanada Pipelines,
a Canadian company, signed an agreement with state owned Ukrgazprom
worth $26.3 million to modernize sections of the 869 mile gas
pipeline between Dolina and Ukraine's
western boarder.
COAL
During the 1990s, Ukraine's
coal industry witnessed a steady decline in employment and production.
In 1990, the coal industry employed 961,000 workers as compared
to 671,000 today. In 1994, over 4% of the county's
workforce was employed in the coal industry, but by 1996, employment
in this industry had declined by 24%. Between 1990 and 1995 production
fell by 50% and exports fell from 22.04 mmst to 2.64 mmst.
Problems for Ukraine's
coal industry continues to mount in 1997. In April 1997, Ukraine's
Cabinet of Ministers approved a program to close 82 unprofitable
coal mines employing 100,000 workers by 1999. In June 1997, Ukrainian
coal miners, who had not been paid for nearly eight months, protested
in the streets of Kiev as their leaders entered talks with the
government over a settlement. The miners vowed to continue their
protests until the government agreed to pay months of back pay.
Back wages total nearly 1.4 billion hryvna or $765 million. The
protests followed strikes by coal miners in January 1997. At the
time, between 13 and 19 of Ukraine's
236 mines were on strike.
Despite the continued decline, the troubled industry did receive
some assistance. The World Bank approved a $300 million loan in
January 1997 to aid the Ukrainian government while it implemented
a thorough reform of the coal industry. The money would support
safe closure of mines, retraining, relocation of workers to other
mines, and the transfer of social services. In addition, the British
Know How Fund, in March 1997, appointed IMC Economic Consultants
to advise the Ukrainian government on large-scale coal industry
restructuring in a socially responsible manner.
ELECTRICITY
Within the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Ukraine is
the second-largest producer and consumer of electricity. In 1995,
it produced 180.1 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh) and consumed 167.5
billion kwh. Yet, Ukrainian power plants continue to have problems
managing large debts. These debts have accumulated for two reasons.
First, the government had not forced consumers to pay for electricity
received, and second, the average electricity prices did not cover
the cost of production. To combat these problems, the government
started cutting off delinquent customers in mid-1995 and the National
Electricity Regulatory Commission began setting prices in July
1995. However, by mid-1996, electricity consumers still owed Ukrainian
power plants approximately $1.6 billion, while the plants owed
even more to their suppliers. At times, power plants were unable
to purchase fuel which in turn led, to occasional power outages.
In October 1996, electricity was cut off in several districts
of Kiev and the Dnieper and Donbas regions due to fuel shortages.
Over the last year, the Ukrainian government continued its efforts
to stabilize the electricity industry. In March 1997, Ukrainian
officials created a modern, western-style wholesale electricity
market that was hailed by western economists as the best in the
former Soviet Union. The hope was that it would create a more
efficient market and eventually offer cheaper power to Ukrainian
industry and its citizens. Over the following three months however,
the system failed to live up to its potential mostly due to non-payments
and state intervention. The failure of these market reforms threatened
a $317 million World Bank loan granted to help develop the Ukrainian
electricity market. The Ukrainian government responded by passing
a series of resolutions designed to improve payment discipline
and also committed to selling-off regional electricity companies.
However, in August 1997, the World Bank suspended the loan, citing
the government's failure
to fulfill the terms of the loan which included increasing electricity
rates. At the time of the suspension, $26 million had been disbursed
under the loan.
As part of its strategic plan to privatize Ukraine's
electricity sector, the Ukrainian government announced in May
1997, plans to accelerate privatization of four electric generating
companies and twenty-seven distribution companies. The four generating
companies are Dniproenergo, Donbasenergo, Centrenergo, and Zakhidenergo.
Ukraine will receive help in developing this privatization plan
from the British Know How Fund and Schroders, an international
investment bank.
On June 23, 1997, the Ukrainian and Russian electrical grids were
interconnected for the first time in 18 months. The connection
had been severed by Russia because of the high instability of
the Ukrainian grid. The interconnection will help to stabilize
the Ukrainian grid and reduce the need for unscheduled stoppages
of nuclear power plants, and may also enable Ukraine to export
more electricity. The increased revenue from these exports could
allow the government to complete construction of two VVER-1000
nuclear reactors at Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 without western
financing.
Nuclear Energy
Ukraine's nuclear energy
sector continues to be a significant and sometimes controversial
part of its electricity industry, especially the Chernobyl nuclear
power complex. In May 1997, the Ukrainian government considered
sweeping administrative reforms which could shake up the country's
nuclear infrastructure. One of the proposals before the government
would merge the current nuclear power committee, Goscomatom, with
the energy ministry, and lower the status of the environment ministry
to a state committee. The government hoped to submit a final proposal
at the end of May 1997. Also in May 1997, the U.S. and Ukraine
announced the start of negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement
which could lead to significant U.S. nuclear related exports like
fuel and reactors. In December 1996, the Ukrainian government
announced that it was going to authorize the work needed to restart
the Chernobyl-2 nuclear reactor by the end of 1997. On June 27,
1997, the Ukrainian government formally announced that the Chernobyl-1
nuclear reactor would be decommissioned without further operation.
The decree was in compliance with the December 1995 Chernobyl
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with the G-7 countries,
the Moscow nuclear safety summit of April 1996, and Ukraine's
nuclear energy act all of which require the decommissioning of
the Chernobyl complex by 2000. The No. 1 reactor shut down November
30, 1996 for a major engineering reassessment mainly to check
the state of fuel channels. Until now, the government had not
stated whether or not the shutdown was temporary or permanent.
Cost estimates for reactor retubing had run into the hundreds
of millions of dollars and these costs would not be recovered
by 2000 when the plant is scheduled to close permanently. However,
financial arrangements for decommissioning Chernobyl-1 have not
been resolved. Moreover, Westinghouse Electric Corporation received
a $10 million contract to manage implementation of operational
and safety improvements of $125 million at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant. A Project Management Unit will coordinate the construction
of a liquid radioactive waste treatment plant and a spent fuel
interim storage facility. These projects are in preparation for
decommissioning of the Chernobyl power plant. The project is funded
with a grant from the Nuclear Safety Account of the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development.
In June 1997, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
met to consider releasing a loan to Ukraine for completion of
two controversial nuclear power plants, Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4.
The G-7 asked the bank to lend Ukraine $370 million towards completion
of the reactors as part of $3 billion aid package promised to
Ukraine in return for closing down the Chernobyl complex. The
G-7 wants Chernobyl closed, but also wants Ukraine to be less
dependent on Russian gas supplies. The loan is controversial because
two independent reports concluded that the reactor projects did
not meet the bank's
"least cost" criteria. These reports recommended other
alternatives such as gas-fueled power plants. Others like environmentalists
and European parliamentarians have objected to the project citing
low safety standards at existing Ukrainian power plants. The Ukrainian
government maintains that if western countries do not help to
finance alternative power plants, they will be forced to continue
operating at least one Chernobyl reactor.
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
ENERGY OVERVIEW
ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW
ENERGY INDUSTRY
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File last modified: September 17, 1997
Contact:
President: Leonid Kuchma
(next election scheduled: 10/99)
Prime Minister: Valery
Pustovoitenko
Independence: December
1, 1991 (from Soviet Union)
Population (7/96E): 50.9
million
Location/Size: Western
edge of former Soviet Union/233,090 square miles, slightly smaller
than Texas
Major Cities: Kiev (Capital),
L'viv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Donetsk
Languages: Ukrainian (official),
Russian, Romanian, Polish
Ethnic Groups (1996E):
Ukrainian (73%), Russian (22%), Jewish (1%), Other (4%)
Religions: Ukrainian Orthodox,
Ukrainian Catholic, Protestant, Jewish
Defense (6/95): Army,
Air and Air Defense Forces, Navy Internal Troops, National Guard,
Boarder Troops
Currency: Hryvna
Official Exchange Rate (11/11/96):
$1 = 1.86 hryvna
Gross Domestic Product (GDP - market exchange
rates) (1996): $46.5 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1997E):
-5%
Inflation Rate (1996E):
40%
Unemployment Rate (1996E):
1.5%
Trade Balance (1996E):
-$4.1 billion
Exports (1996E): $14.1
billion
Imports (1996E): $18.2
billion
Major Export Products: Coal,
electric power, metals, chemicals, machinery, grain, meat
Major Import Products:
Oil, gas, transportation equipment, machinery and parts, textiles,
chemicals
Major Trading Partners:
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, China, Turkmenistan, Poland, Bulgaria,
Romania, Germany
Proven Oil Reserves (1996E):
595 million barrels
Oil Production (1996E):
97,000 barrels per day (b/d), of which 71,000 b/d was crude oil
Oil Production Capacity (1996):
100,000 b/d
Oil Consumption (1996E):
400,000 b/d
Crude Refining Capacity (1/1/97):
1.25 million b/d
Net Oil Imports (1996E):
300,000 b/d
Natural Gas Reserves (1996E):
69 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
Natural Gas Production (1996E):
0.6 Tcf
Natural Gas Consumption (1996E):
2.8 Tcf
Natural Gas Imports (1996E):
2.2 Tcf
Coal Production (1996E):
80 million short tons (mmst)
Coal Consumption (1996E):
80 mmst
Electricity Generation Capacity (1995):
54.2 gigawatts
Electricity Production (1995):
180.1 billion kilowatthours
Total Energy Consumption (1995):
6.3 quadrillion Btu
Energy Consumption per Capita (1995):
122.5 million Btu (vs. 331.8 million Btu in U.S.)
Energy-related Carbon Emissions (1995):
105.5 million metric tons (1.7% of world carbon emissions)
Carbon Emissions per Capita (1995):
2.0 metric tons (vs. 5.42 metric tons in U.S.)
Major Environmental Issues:
Air and water pollution, deforestation, radiation contamination
in the northeast from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident
Organization: Minenergo
(government agency that oversees all of Ukraine=s fossil-fuel-fired
power plants, as well as its transportation and distribution systems);
Ukrneft (national oil company and umbrella organization for other
state-owned oil enterprises); Chernomorneftegaz (offshore production
association); Ukrneftegaz (state oil and gas production company);
Goskomatom (state committee responsible for the country=s use
of nuclear power).
Major Oil/Gas Fields:
Poltava-Province/Dnepro-Donetsk Basin, West Ukrainian/Carpathian
Fields, Crimea, Arkhangelskoye (NW Crimea) Field, and the Sea
of Azov
Major Oil Ports: Odessa,
Sevastopol, Feodosiya
Oil Export Pipelines Crossing Ukraine:
Friendship (Druzhba) (1.2 million b/d), Eastern Products (30,000
b/d)
Major Oil Refineries (1/1/97 crude processing
capacity): Lisichansk (481,973 b/d), Kremenchug
(360,000 b/d), Kherson (172,707 b/d); Odessa (78,321 b/d); Drogobich
(78,321 b/d); Nadvornaja (74,304 b/d)
Major Foreign Oil Company Involvement:
Fountain Oil, Odyssey Petroleum, Trident Exploration
Gas Export Pipelines Crossing Ukraine (Capacity):
Northern Lights (0.8 Tcf), Progress (1
Tcf), Shebelinka (0.7 Tcf), Soyuz (1 Tcf), Urengoi (1 Tcf), West
Ukraine (0.15 Tcf)
Major Coal Fields: Donets
Basin (Donbas), L'viv-Volhynian (West Ukraine), Dneiper (lignite
basin)
Nuclear Power Plants (Capacity):
Chernobyl 1-3 (2,367 MW), Khmelnitski-1 (950 MW), Rovno 1-3 (1,762
MW), South Ukraine 1-3 (2,850 MW), Zaporozhe 1-6 (5,700 MW)
For more information on Ukraine, see these other sources on the EIA web site:
International Petroleum Statistics Report - EIA's latest monthly international petroleum data
International Energy Annual 1995 - Annual international energy data through 1995
Latest EIA Detailed Annual Data (1994)
WORLD ENERGY Database for the International Energy Annual (requires Microsoft Access)
1997 CIA World Factbook - Ukraine
U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy's International section - Ukraine
U.S. Embassy in Ukraine
BISNIS - the Department of Commerce's Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States
Home Page for the United Nation's office in Ukraine
General Information about Ukraine
News and Information about Russia, the CIS, and Baltic countries
Erik Kreil
ekreil@eia.doe.gov
Phone: (202)586-6573
Fax: (202)586-9753
URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ukraine.htm