Turkey is important to world energy markets. Turkey's geographical location makes it a natural "energy bridge" between major oil producing areas in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus and, consumer markets in Europe. Second, it has been designated as one of the world's ten "Big Emerging Markets" (with a rapidly-growing energy sector)

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GENERAL BACKGROUND

In December 1995, Turkey held national elections which resulted in a narrow victory for the Islamist Welfare Party, with the True Path Party of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and the Motherland Party led by Mesut Yilmaz coming in a close second and third. In early March 1996, Ciller and Yilmaz agreed on a plan under which their parties would form a coalition government while Ciller and Yilmaz would share the premiership on a rotating basis. The coalition government they formed collapsed in June 1996, and Yilmaz resigned as Prime Minister. President Demirel called upon Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party to form a new government. A new coalition was formed between the Welfare Party and the True Path Party. Erbakan became Prime Minister, and Ciller became Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and she will assume the premiership in two years. Turkey's new government faces many challenges including a troubled, but growing economy, rapid growth in energy demand, and continued guerrilla insurgency in the southeastern portion of the country.

The economy grew by 6.9 percent in 1996, following a 7.3 percent increase in 1995, but high inflation continues to be a problem. Although inflation was below the triple digit levels Turkey experienced in 1994, inflation in 1996 was above 80 percent. The country also saw its trade deficit grow by 39.3 percent in 1996, despite a near 5 percent increase in exports. The United Nations (UN) embargo on Iraq is estimated to have cost Turkey $27 billion in trade, including $2 billion in annual pipeline revenues. The Erbakan government has also pledged to substantially increase civil servant salaries, which will place added strain on the budget, and a depreciating currency.

Energy is one of Turkey's most important development priorities. Rapid increases in domestic energy demand have forced Turkey to increase its dependency on foreign energy supplies and to face the prospect of a severe energy shortage in the 21st century. Blackouts and brownouts are frequent occurrences in Eastern Turkey, and scheduled blackouts could begin in Ankara and Istanbul this year. In response to this situation, Turkey has planned major new investment in its domestic power infrastructure and pursued new supply sources abroad.

A major dilemma now faced by Turkey is how to invest in new energy capacity while at the same time adhering to foreign debt ceilings mandated under lending rules set by the International Monetary Fund. Conventional financing of major infrastructure projects would only increase the amount of foreign credit, thus Turkey's Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) has conceived other options for financing projects.

The first option MENR offered was the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme. Under this arrangement, private developers are allowed to recover their costs for building a plant through operating it for a fixed period before handing it back to the state. Originally introduced in 1984 by then Prime Minister Turgat Ozal, the financing scheme has been plagued by legal problems about the status of the agreements. The Turkish government has considered proposals from several different international consortia for BOT oil and gas plants, coal-fired plants, and hydroelectric-electric power station projects, but only three of the sixteen projects that have met legal approval are currently under construction.

In June 1996, MENR introduced the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) financing model. Developers retain ownership of the plant, and they would be given the option to sell the power produced to an end-user, to the state-owned electricity authority or directly into the national grid. The state would also not have to assume ownership of the plants as under the BOT scheme. MENR issued tenders for six "emergency" plants to be financed under BOO. These plants were to be commissioned between 2000 and 2005 to meet the growing energy demand. By the end of the December 1996 deadline 57 of over 130 bidders had prequalified, but in early 1997 Turkey's supreme administrative court, and the Danistay or council of state issued stop-action orders on BOO projects. The MENR plans to appeal the rulings, but the future of the projects is clouded.

The Turkish government announced in December 1996 a plan to lease twelve existing power plants. Funds from the twenty-year leases would be used to help finance new energy projects and balance the budget.

Foreign Relations

Turkey's energy and foreign policies are closely linked. Most importantly, Turkey's geographic location makes it a natural bridge between the energy-rich Middle East and Central Asian regions on the one hand, and the energy-consuming nations of Europe on the other. In addition, Turkey maintains strong economic and political ties to the West, including membership in the OECD, a Customs Union with Europe (effective as of January 1, 1996), and NATO, while simultaneously occupying a position as a leading Muslim nation. Finally, Turkey has strong historical, ethnic, and linguistic ties to Central Asia's Turkic peoples. The combination of all these factors places Turkey in a unique position as a potential intermediary between East and West.

Turkey's current government has made recent overtures to countries isolated by the international community. Prime Minister Erbakan has visited Libya, Nigeria, and Iran, and energy deals have been signed with all three. It remains to be seen if the gas agreement signed with Iran in August of 1996 will trigger implementation of the U.S. Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act (Oil Sanctions Act). Turkey has stated that it will finance and construct only the necessary infrastructure in its own territory, which in their view would not be in violation of the Oil Sanctions Act.

The six- month UN deal that allows Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil for humanitarian supplies means that crude is again flowing through the pipeline from fields in Iraq to the port of Ceyhan. Before the embargo, Iraq exported nearly one-third of its oil through the twin pipeline. Turkey has plans to increase capacity on the pipeline from Iraq, and has laid the groundwork for a deal to purchase gas from Iraq.

Turkey currently relies on Russia as a significant source of energy, but is also competing with it for routes for pipelines carrying oil and gas from Kazakstan and Azerbaijan to Western markets in Europe and beyond.

The new Turkish government has not moved to dismantle the military accord its predecessors signed with Israel. Turkey is still viewed as a possible link (via pipeline) for Israel to receive natural gas from either Russia or Turkmenistan.

PRIVATIZATION

A cornerstone of the Turkish government's economic reform efforts is a sweeping privatization program designed to transfer large portions of state assets to the private sector, including major portions of the power industry. Revenues from sale of state-owned businesses have totaled $3.25 billion since 1986 , with remaining government-owned enterprises valued at $60 billion. The pace of privatization has increased under the new coalition government, with nearly all of Turkey's cement industry and the operation of ports being privatized. The electricity sector, which is over 90% state owned, is a chief target of the nation's privatization efforts.

Privatization has been slowed by legal debates both in parliament and in the Turkish constitutional court. After considerable delay, a privatization bill was finally agreed upon in Parliament in November of 1994. This initially raised hopes of a speedy implementation of the program in the power sector, until the constitutional court rejected privatization of the Turkish Electricity Board (TEK) after an appeal by several political parties opposed to the effort.

Privatization in the Turkish power sector is going forth, though expectations are that the process will be piecemeal and somewhat erratic. At the top of the Turkish Electricity Generation & Transmission Corporation's (TEAS), the state power company, privatization list are ten large thermal power stations and eight lignite-fired plants, along with seven distribution companies. State petroleum distribution and refining industries are also on the privatization block.

MENR's recently announced lease program for power plants may run into problems as five of the plants are currently under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Privatization Administration.

OIL

Turkish oil consumption has increased in recent years, and this trend is expected to continue into the near future. Oil provides nearly half of Turkey's total energy requirements, and reliance on imported crude has grown. Major suppliers of crude to Turkey are Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Libya, and Russia. Turkey signed an agreement to purchase 75,000 b/d of crude in December 1996 from the UN approved Iraqi oil sale. It was Turkey's first oil purchase in six years from a former key crude supplier. Nearly 70 percent of LPG's consumed in Turkey is imported. LPG is mainly used as a residential heating and cooking fuel and as a power supply in industry. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria are the leading suppliers.

Domestic oil production is primarily done by three companies, the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO), and foreign operators Royal Dutch/Shell (Shell) and Mobil. Oil fields in the country's southeast (the main producing area) are generally small and expensive to exploit, although several promising discoveries have been made in the region in recent years. Generous tax incentives exist for exploration by the foreign companies already present in Turkey, and the government plans to make regulations progressively easier for new entrants.

Exploration is currently under way in southeast Anatolia, Thrace, the Black Sea, Tarsus Zone and Adana basins. Exploration in the southeast has been affected by the guerrilla insurgency of the PKK, the banned Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party which supports creation of a national homeland for Turkey's Kurdish ethnic minority. The PKK has targeted, among other things, pipeline facilities and hydroelectric projects in its campaign against the Turkish government. Kurdish rebels blew up a small oil pipeline in Batman in April of 1997 that disrupted production at the 2,200 b/d, Mobil operated Selmo field. An earlier attack in January on the Iraqi-Turkey pipeline did not disrupt the oil flow since it hit a line that wasn't being used.

Turkey is looking to Central Asia to provide the major portion of its future oil needs, and has begun projects to develop supplies there. TPAO is currently investigating oil prospects in Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. In September 1994, TPAO became part of a consortium of foreign oil companies in a multi-billion dollar oil production-sharing agreement with Azeri state oil company Socar to develop three offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea. TPAO originally held a 1.75% share in the group, but this was raised to a 6.75% share after further negotiations. TPAO also became a partner (9% interest) in the Azeri Shah Deniz field during the summer of 1996. In Kazakstan, TPAO established an oil exploration company, Kazakhturkmunay, with the Kazakh ministries of geology and energy. Fourteen discoveries have been made on TPAO's six Kazakh concessions, and four are onstream with a total production capacity of 1,750 b/d.

TPAO is also involved in oil exploration/production in North Africa. It is currently producing in Egypt, signed exploration accords with Libya, and is expected to finalize agreements with Algeria and Tunisia by the end of 1997.

Pipelines

Oil transportation is a crucial and contentious issue in the Caspian Sea region. Turkey, Russia and Iran are competing to route the rich resources of Central Asia through its territory. Two basic schemes are being proposed for pipelines to transport oil from the Caspian Sea region. Turkey is pressing for a pipeline that would carry oil through Iran, Armenia or Georgia and then across Turkey to the Mediterranean. Russia, on the other hand, is promoting a pipeline across the Caucasus to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there oil would be transported through Turkey's Bosporus Straits or via a proposed pipeline from Bulgaria to Greece en route to Europe.

In early October 1995, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), the consortium developing oil resources in the Caspian Sea region, tentatively decided to split any "early" (i.e. short-term) oil exports through Russia (Baku-Novorossiysk) and via a new pipeline to Turkey(Baku-Soupsa-Ceyhan). Turkey originally agreed to help finance the construction of the section from Baku to the Georgian port of Soupsa. The Yilmaz government issued new conditions to the AIOC that were to be met before they would finance the Baku-Soupsa construction. The demands included a guarantee of the construction of the pipeline from Baku-Ceyhan for the "main" oil. The AIOC rejected these terms and decided to finance the Baku-Soupsa line. It now seems that all early oil is destined to flow through the Bosporus. Initial output of about 80,000 b/d, mainly from 3 offshore fields in the Caspian Sea off Azerbaijan, is expected to begin flowing in early 1997. The AIOC has stated that the Baku-Soupsa line could be operational by the end of 1998.

The AIOC must still decide on an export route for the greater volumes (2 million b/d or more) of "main" oil production expected to come on-line from fields in Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan after 2000. Possible routes include the two early oil routes (Baku-Novorossiysk, and Baku-Soupsa), Baku-Ceyhan, Baku-Batumi (on the Georgian coast), and through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The World Bank has agreed to finance feasibility studies of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and it would be prepared to finance the project if it is deemed economically and environmentally feasible, as well as secure.

In January of 1997, Energy Minister Recai Kutan announced the signing of a protocol between Iran and Turkey about the construction of a pipeline to transport Iranian oil from the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan.

The Bosporus

The choices for the routes of early Caspian Sea oil will likely increase tanker traffic through the Bosporus, the narrow Turkish channel connecting the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea. Currently, an estimated 1.4 million b/d of oil is shipped through the Bosporus. Over three-fourths of this amount is headed southwards from the former Soviet Union to Europe. Turkey has expressed strong environmental concerns about any increased shipping traffic through the area. Turkey has begun to restrict the number of ships allowed through the waterway, citing its fear that the high volume of traffic there has increased the number of collisions and the likelihood of major oil spills. Approximately 45,000 vessels traverse the Bosporus annually, making it three-times busier than the Suez Canal. Russia maintains that these restrictions are politically motivated, and are designed to deter its role as the chief Caspian Sea oil exporter. However, there are grounds for Turkish concerns over the Bosporus: between 1988 and 1994, the number of collisions increased dramatically, including a 1994 incident in which a tanker laden with 19 million gallons of oil burned for a week. Turkey has installed an advanced radar system to track ships traveling through the narrow strait, and adopted new safety rules.

Refineries

Refining in Turkey is dominated by the state-owned company TUPRAS, which has four main refining complexes: Batman in the southeast, Aliaga near Izmir, Izmit near Istanbul, and the Central Anatolian Refinery (CAR) at Kirikkale near Ankara. TUPRAS has undertaken a modernization program, now well-advanced, which is designed to switch output at these refineries towards light products in line with changing demand. Turkey's sole private refinery is ATAS, near Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, a joint venture of British Petroleum, Shell and local Turcas Petrolculuk.

Privatization of Turkey's state refining assets is seen as critical to the success of economic reform efforts. Over 70 percent of the industry is available for sale. However, foreign interest in the two state refineries currently being privatized, Izmit and Izmir, is relatively low. The state-owned distribution company, Petrol Ofisi (PO) is also on the privatization list. PO is the largest of the 14 petroleum distribution firms operating in Turkey.

NATURAL GAS

Demand for natural gas is projected to increase dramatically in Turkey over the next 10-15 years, with the prime consumers expected to be industry and power plants. Several independent estimates see Turkey's consumption nearly tripling to 740 billion cubic feet (bcf) by the end of the decade, and reaching 1,400 bcf by 2020.

Current gas production in Turkey meets just 2.8 percent of its consumption requirements. Turkey's 14 gas fields produced 7.1 bcf in 1995. The first offshore production will come on-line in 1997 in the Marmara Sea. The field has estimated reserves of 106 bcf.

The bulk of Turkish gas demand is met by imports. Currently Turkey's main supplier of natural gas is Russia, which assumed contractual responsibility from the former Soviet Union for a pipeline running inside Turkey from the Bulgarian border up to Ankara. Russia began supplying Turkey with 200 bcf of gas annually in 1987 through the pipeline. In February 1997, Russia agreed to increase gas supplies to 280 bcf beginning in 1998. Also in February, Turkey reached an agreement with Georgia to receive Russian gas via a pipeline through its territory. The accord entails the construction of a 19-mile (30-kilometer(km)) pipeline extension to the Turkish border, with initial shipments of 106 bcf per year. Expansion and rehabilitation of the Georgian pipeline will increase the annual gas flow capacity to 318 bcf. Russia also made an agreement to increase exports to Turkey to 1,060 bcf by the year 2010. In January 1997, the Russian gas company, Gazprom announced that its board of directors had approved a new export pipeline to Turkey. The $2.5 billion, 750-mile (1,200-km) pipeline would run from Izobilnoye in southern Russia, to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then under the Black Sea to the Turkish port of Samsun, and then to Ankara. When completed the line would be the world's deepest underwater gas pipeline. The high cost and complex engineering could push Russia to choose alternate routes (parallel to the current pipeline through Bulgaria or through Armenia).

Turkey has also looked to other sources to increase and diversify its gas supplies. In February 1996, the Presidents of Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which calls for Turkmen gas exports to Turkey beginning in 1998 at about 70 bcf per year, and reaching 530 bcf by 2020. In addition, Turkey also plans to sign an agreement to import Iraqi gas. Iraq's Oil Minister, Amir Muhammed Rashid, said that an agreement to supply Turkey with 350 bcf of gas over a 10 year period will be signed in July. The two countries will jointly build a 185-mile (300-km) pipeline needed for the supplies. Turkey's most controversial import scheme is the $20 billion, 22-year deal with Iran. Initial annual deliveries of 105 bcf of gas are scheduled to begin in 1999, and eventually reach 350 bcf by 2005. The supply contract will require construction of three new pipelines in Turkey. The local consortium of Fernas and STFA Enerkom has won the bid to construct the 46-inch 160-mile (260-km) line from Dogubeyazit, on the Iranian border, to Erzurum. In April 1997, Botas, the state-owned pipeline company, requested bids on a 252-mile (403-km) link between Erzurum and Sivas as well as a connecting 288-mile (461-km) pipeline between Sivas and Ankara. This deal has brought criticism from the Untied States, which views the deal as supporting the current Iranian regime, and as a possible violation of the Oil Sanctions Act.

LNG

Turkey also plans to utilize imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to help meet demand requirements. Turkey began receiving 70 bcf of LNG from Algeria in 1994 at the terminal at Ereglisi on the Marmara Sea. The shipment was part of a twenty-year deal reached with Algeria in the mid-1980s. In 1995 capacity at the terminal was increased to 105 bcf per year. The terminal has also received spot-shipments of LNG from Australia. Turkey has also signed MOUs with Nigeria, Qatar, and Yemen to receive supplies of LNG. Nigeria will ship 32 bcf of LNG annually beginning in 1999. Qatar will supply 70 bcf per year over a 25-year period commencing in 1999. Yemen's 25-year deal calls for exports of nearly 90 bcf of LNG per year starting in 2001. Shipments of LNG from Oman are also being considered.

New LNG terminals are also being planned. Plans call for a new terminal adjacent to the existing Ereglisi facility, a second at Aliaga, near Izmir on the Aegean Sea, and a third at Iskenderun on the Mediterranean. The Izmir facility is part of a $4 billion MOU signed between Turkey and Egypt in November 1996. The ambitious agreement calls for exports of nearly 350 bcf of LNG from fields offshore the Nile Delta. First deliveries of LNG are expected to commence in 2000.

ELECTRIC POWER

Increasing the country's electricity generating capacity continues to be a top priority for Turkish energy officials. Turkish electric power demand has been steadily growing, averaging 11% annual growth over the last 40 years, and projections by Turkey's Electricity Generating and Transmission Corporation (TEAS) indicate 8% annual growth over the next 15 years. This means that national electric power consumption will more than triple by 2010, to 240 billion kilowatt hours. MENR has drawn up plans to install 33 lignite-fired units, 27 natural gas-fired units, 12 coal-fired plants, 2 nuclear power plants, and 113 hydroelectric units to meet these needs. This will require an estimated $35-$50 billion in new investments over the next 10 years. Turkey has also recommissioned three lignite-fired plants to help meet growing electricity needs. The plants were originally closed over environmental concerns.

Turkey will look outside its borders to help meet the growing demand for electricity. A large portion of the increased natural gas imports will go into electricity generation, and the proposed new LNG terminals will also be attached to new Independent Power Producer (IPP) gas-fired generation facilities. Turkey has also signed agreements with Bulgaria, Georgia and Iran to increase imports of electricity from these countries.

The MENR is looking to the private sector to finance the majority of the new power projects needed. Domestic IPP plants are increasing. There have been 17 plants commissioned since 1992 with total capacity of 380 megawatts (mw). The plants output is primarily used on-site, but excess production is sold to TEAS. They now provide about 5% of Turkey's electricity. An additional 32 plants with capacity of 707 mw have been licensed by MENR, but are not yet commissioned.

Notwithstanding legal obstacles, BOT and BOO projects are expected to play a major part in the restructuring of the Turkish power industry. The challenge for Turkish authorities is to reassure foreign lenders that the complex financing structures required for these projects will be honored and protected. Investors have balked at taking on Turkish investment risk as a result of political uncertainties over privatization laws. Thus far three BOT projects have been approved. The first was the $1.3 billion, 672 mw, Birecik dam and hydroelectric plant on the Euphrates River. It is part of the $32 billion Southeast Anatolia Project(GAP) hydropower and irrigation project. When completed, GAP will include 21 dams, 19 hydroelectric plants and a network of tunnels and canals for irrigation. Construction began on two 480 mw, gas-fired plants in the fall of 1996, and they are scheduled to come on-line by the end of 1999.

The MENR has received over 130 bids for the six "emergency" BOO projects it announced in June 1996. There are four 700 mw gas-fired plants, one 1,400 mw gas-fired plant, and a 1,000 mw plant that will utilize imported coal. The plants are all to be commissioned by 2005. The MENR also has plans for seven additional BOO plants with total capacity of 5,500 mw. Five will be gas-fired, and the others will use imported coal. Hydroelectric, nuclear and geothermal projects are excluded from BOO financing.

Although estimates are that geothermal power in Turkey could amount to 31.5 gigawatts, little progress has been made on exploiting this potential due to technical, financial, and administrative problems. Also, plans to build the country's first nuclear plant, a 1,200 megawatt facility to be built at Akkuyu, on the southern Mediterranean coast, has run into opposition. The South Korean Atomic Agency has been chosen for consultancy services for the project. Turkey's public has been wary of nuclear power since the Chernobyl accident of April 26, 1986.

COAL

Coal is a major fuel source for Turkey, used primarily for power generation, steel manufacturing, and cement production. The country is a large producer of lignite (brown coal), which comes predominantly from deposits in the southwest and the southeastern Afsin-Elbistan basin. Lignite extraction is expected to increase as the government feels pressure to close down unprofitable hard coal mines in the southeastern Zonguldak region. In addition to their low levels of production, these mines are geologically difficult, increasing the cost of extraction. Furthermore, they have a poor safety record. Opposition to any mine closures by coal miners is expected unless an adequate compensation plan is worked out with the government.

Turkey imports significant amounts of hard coal, mainly from Australia, the United States, South Africa, and the former Soviet Union. This coal is used mainly to supply Ankara and three other large municipalities, all of which have chosen to use hard coal rather than lignite as a source of heat and power in order to reduce the large amounts of pollution that result from lignite burning. Negotiations have taken place on procurement of coking coal supplies by Turkey's Iron and Steelworks Administration from the Russian coal producer's group, Rosugol. Part of the deal is reportedly involves the participation of Turkish contracting companies in the rehabilitation of Russian Black Sea ports.

COUNTRY OVERVIEW
President: Suleyman Demirel
Prime Minister: Necmettin Erbakan (Welfare Party) and Tansu Ciller (True Path Party) on a rotating basis
Independence: October 29, 1923 (successor state to the Ottoman Empire)
Population (7/96E): 62.5 million
Location/Size: Southwest Asia/780,580 sq. km (301,930 sq. mi.), slightly larger than Texas
Major Cities: Ankara (capital), Istanbul, Izmir, Adana
Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic
Ethnic Groups: Turkish (80%), Kurdish (20%)
Religions: Muslim (99.8%, mostly Sunni), other 0.2%
Defense (1994): Army (393,000), Navy (54,000), Air Force (56,800), Gendarmerie (50,000)

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Currency: Turkish lira (TL)
Market Exchange Rate (4/21/97): US$1=133,000 TL
Gross Domestic/National Product (GDP) (1996E, purchasing power equivalent): $345.7 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1996E): 6.9%
Inflation Rate (1996E): 80.4%
Current Account Balance (1996E): -$8.2 billion
Major Trading Partners: Germany, Italy, United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia
Exports (1996E): $23.1 billion
Imports (1996E): $41.5 billion
Major Export Products: Agricultural, textiles, iron, steel
Major Import Products: Oil, machinery, chemicals, iron, steel
Unemployment Rate (1995E): 10.2%
Total External Debt (2Q96E): $75.8 billion

ENERGY OVERVIEW
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources: Recai Kutan
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/97): 260 million barrels
Oil Production (1996): 71,200 barrels per day (b/d) of which 67,200 b/d is crude oil
Oil Consumption (1996E): 600,000 b/d
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/97):683,000 b/d
Net Oil Imports (1995): 557,000 b/d
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/97): 312 billion cubic feet (bcf)
Natural Gas Production (1995): 7.1 bcf
Natural Gas Consumption (1995): 250.7 bcf
Coal Production (1995): 59.7 million short tons (95% lignite)
Coal Consumption (1995): 67.2 million short tons
Estimated Recoverable Coal (1996): 8.2 billions short tons of lignite
Electric Generation Capacity (1/1/96): 20.9 million kilowatts
Electricity Generation (1995): 82.9 billion kilowatt hours (bkwh)
Electricity Consumption (1995): 76.4 bkwh

ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW
Total Energy Consumption (1995): 2.5 quadrillion Btu
Energy Consumption per Capita (1995): 40.0 million Btu (vs. 331.8 million Btu in U.S.)
Energy-related Carbon Emissions (1995): 45.85 million metric tons (0.7% of world emissions)
Carbon Emissions per Capita (1995): 0.7 metric tons (vs. 5.4 million metric tons in U.S.)
Major Environmental Issues: Water pollution from dumping of chemicals and detergents; air pollution; deforestation

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES
State Oil Company: Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS)
State Pipelines and Gas Agency: Botas
Major Ports: Iskenderun, Istanbul, Mersin, Izmir
Major Oil and Gas Fields: Bati Raman, Karakus, K. Karakus
Major Pipelines: Turkey-Iraq ; Turkey contains 1078 miles of crude oil pipelines, 1439 miles of oil product pipelines, and 439 miles of natural gas pipelines
Major Refineries (crude oil capacity): Izmit (226,440 b/d), Aliaga-Izmir (226,440 b/d), Kirikkale (113,200 b/d), Mersin (95,000 b/d), Batman-Siirt (22,015 b/d)

Links to other sites:
1997 CIA World Factbook - Turkey
U.S. International Trade Administration, Country Commercial Guide - Turkey
U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy's International section - Turkey
Consular Information Sheet - Turkey from the U.S. Department of State
U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies - Turkey

The following links are provided solely as a service to our customers, and therefore should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any position of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the United States Government. In addition, EIA does not guarantee the content or accuracy of any information presented in linked sites.
Republic of Turkey's Home Page
Turkish State Pipeline Company (Botas)
Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO)
Turkey Market Research Reports
The Center for Middle Eastern Studies - Turkey

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File last modified: May 12, 1997

Contact:

Elias Johnson
ejohnson@eia.doe.gov
Phone: (202)586-7277
Fax: (202)586-9753