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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In late May 1997, former Culture Minister Mohammad Khatami won the Iranian presidential elections in an upset victory over parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri. Khatami replaced Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as President in August 1997. Khatami, who ran on a relatively progressive platform (including calls for social justice), won overwhelmingly with about 70% of the 29.7 million votes cast in the election Since his inauguration in August 1997, Khatami -- considered a relatively moderate cleric -- has moved cautiously in the direction of improved relations with Arab states and the West.

Whatever President Khatami's intentions, he must take into account several other power centers. Among the most important of these are: the conservative clergy, as exemplified by Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei; the 270-member Majlis (Consultative Assembly), in which conservatives hold about one-third of the seats, moderates another third, independents about one-fourth, and religious minorities the remainder; and former President Rafsanjani, who now heads the powerful Expediency Council. Political divisions between hard-liners and moderates were evidenced on March 2, 1998, when violence broke out outside Tehran University between hundreds of President Khatami's supporters and opponents.

Iran's economy, currently operating under a five-year plan ending in 2000, grew strongly in 1997, partly due to relatively high oil prices. In 1998, however, growth is expected to slow due to a sharp drop in oil prices (and revenues). Iran's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 3.4% in 1997, with a forecast slowdown to 2.3% growth in 1998. A major aim of Iran's government is to keep inflation under control, largely through a tight fiscal policy. Repayment of Iran's large foreign debt also remains a priority (and a drag on economic growth), with debt service in 1998 made more difficult by projected lower-then-expected oil prices (oil export revenues account for around 40% of government revenues). In January 1998, Iran's Majlis (parliament) lowered its oil price forecast for the fiscal year beginning March 21, 1998 to $16 per barrel. In late February 1998, Iran's Central Bank stated that it might be forced to lower this estimate to $10 per barrel. Iran claims it loses $1 billion for each $1 per barrel drop in the price of its oil. Iran is attempting to persuade OPEC members to cut production in order to raise oil prices.

In December 1998, the Iranian government announced that it would raise gasoline prices at the pump by 25% in the next fiscal year (beginning March 21, 1998). Subsidies on oil products amount to some $11 billion a year (twice the country's development budget), placing significant strains on the national budget, contributing to widespread inefficiencies in the Iranian economy, and increasing domestic demand for oil (thus reducing the amount left over for export). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is pushing Iran to cut subsidies, as well as to liberalize trade and taxation, and to unify the country's two-tier exchange rate system. President Khatami, who was elected largely on a platform of social justice, must balance his desire for economic reform and development with political pressures to keep unemployment low and to avoid social unrest. In mid-March 1998, the Iranian government announced plans to privatize about 2,400 state-owned companies, including several in the oil, petrochemical, and other energy sectors.

President Khatami aims to make Iran more attractive to foreign investment, particularly in the critical oil and gas sectors. Top priorities for improving the investment climate are increased protection from nationalization and easier repatriation of profits. Iran is predicting $7 billion of new foreign investment in the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors during the new fiscal year beginning March 21, 1998, and up to $94 billion total through 2010.

U.S. Relations/Sanctions
The United States and Iran have been at odds since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The U.S. government's current "containment" policy towards Iran is based on the U.S. view that Iran supports international terrorism, is developing its military capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems), is opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and generally represents a destabilizing political force in the region In a possible move towards rapprochement, President Khatami has, in recent months, offered words of praise for the United States and called for a dialogue between the two countries. Khatami's latest statements are not totally surprising given that shortly after his election, Khatami had published a signed article in Al-Hayat, a prominent Arabic-language newspaper, in which he wrote that "we should look to the West in an unprejudiced way...without love, without hatred." On the other hand, Khatami also has stated that "U.S. policies have always been hostile to our revolution or our system" and has indicated that U.S.-Iran relations would only improve with a change in U.S. policies. The Clinton Administration has reacted to Khatami's latest comments cautiously, with a call for direct dialogue between the two countries, and for Iran to moderate its behavior.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was passed unanimously by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in August 1996. ILSA imposes mandatory and discretionary sanctions on non-U.S. companies which invest more than $20 million annually (lowered in August 1997 from $40 million) in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. The passage of ILSA was not the first U.S. sanction against Iran. In early 1995, President Clinton signed two Executive Orders which prohibited U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran. The Orders also banned any "contract for the financing of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran." As a result, U.S.-based Conoco was obligated to abrogate a $550-million contract to develop Iran's offshore Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. On August 19, 1997, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13059 reaffirming that virtually all trade and investment activities by U.S. citizens in Iran are prohibited.

The threat of secondary U.S. sanctions has deterred some multinationals from investing in Iran. In August 1996, Australia's BHP pulled out of a proposed $3-billion pipeline project to transport Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, other firms have committed to sizable oil and gas sector projects in Iran despite U.S. sanctions. In particular, France's Total and Malaysia's Petronas are proceeding with development of the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields, and a Total consortium is set to help develop the giant South Pars gas field. Total has escaped U.S. sanctions for its Sirri deal because, despite the $600 million size of this investment, the deal was signed prior to ILSA's August 1996 enactment. Petronas, which acquired a 30% stake in the Sirri deal in 1996, stated in early March 1998 that it would not withdraw from the project despite U.S. objections.

Following the passage of ILSA, Iran and Turkey signed a 22-year gas supply deal worth an estimated $20 billion. Despite U.S. government opposition, Turkish officials stated in March 1997 that they were proceeding with the construction of the required infrastructure. Attempts by the United States to implement ILSA have run into opposition from a number of foreign governments. The European Union, for one, believes that ILSA is "unacceptable" and has barred European companies from complying with it. One possible loophole under ILSA is a provision which allows waiver of sanctions for countries that take "significant steps, including the imposition of economic sanctions" towards Iran. The EU argues that it has taken significant steps towards restricting Iran's access to weapons of mass destruction. The EU also has warned that imposition of sanctions on Total could lead to a trade war with the United States. Another possibility is that President Clinton can waive sanctions in the "national interest," or delay sanctions for up to 180 days pending a final decision.

Foreign Affairs
In recent months, Iran has made progress in improving relations with a variety of countries. In December, 1997, Iran hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Tehran. During this well-attended (more than 50 countries) meeting, Iranian President Khatami met twice with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the first such high-level meetings between Iranian and Saudi leaders since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The meetings were evidence of movement towards generally better relations between the two countries. In February 1998, former President Rafsanjani visited Saudi Arabia for 10 days for talks on boosting bilateral ties and formulating a "security and economic strategy" for boosting security in the region. Rafsanjani was the most senior Iranian to visit Saudi Arabia since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

In November 1997, European Union (EU) ambassadors returned to Iran. In April 1997, all 15 EU-member nations recalled their ambassadors from Tehran following a German court ruling that the Iranian government was responsible for the 1992 killings of four opposition emigres in Germany. Besides recalling its ambassadors, the EU had stated its intention to break-off its "critical dialogue" with Iran.

Negotiations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Abu Musa and Tunb Islands remained stalled. The Greater and Lesser Tunbs were seized by Iran from Ras al-Khaimah in 1971. In 1992, Iran claimed sovereignty over Abu Musa despite a 1971 agreement between the two countries. Joint control of Abu Musa was maintained until 1994, at which time Iran forcibly took the island. In March 1996, Iran rejected a proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council which advocated that the International Court of Justice resolve the dispute, an option supported by the UAE. This rejection was preceded in December 1995 by an Iranian Foreign Ministry statement declaring that the islands are "an inseparable part of Iran." In 1996, Iran took further moves to strengthen its hold on the disputed islands. These moves included starting-up a power plant on Greater Tunb, opening an airport on Abu Musa, and planning the construction of a new port on Abu Musa. In the dispute, the UAE has received strong support not only from the GCC, but from the United Nations and the United States. In December 1997, the UAE called for talks with Iran over the islands, and Iran has called for closer ties with its Arab neighbors. In early March 1998, the GCC, while praising Iran's President Khatami, issued a statement supporting the UAE in its dispute with Iran over Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

With respect to Iraq, a dialogue between the two countries led to an exchange of the remains of 75 soldiers killed on both sides during the Iran-Iraq War in April 1997. Also in 1997, evidence was gathered by the U.N. Security Council that Iran was assisting Iraq in smuggling refined products, mainly diesel fuel, to international markets. This reportedly has occurred in a number of cases where Iran has helped to falsify bills of lading that claim the Iraqi diesel shipments originated in Iranian ports.

OIL
Iran holds 93 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, or roughly 9% of the world's total. The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the Khuzestan region near the Iraqi border and Persian Gulf terminus. More than half of Iran's 40 producing fields contain over one billion barrels of oil. The onshore Ahwaz, Marun, Gachsaran, Agha Jari, and Bibi Hakimeh fields alone account for about two-thirds of Iran's oil production. Most of Iran's crude oil is low in sulfur and light, with gravities in the 30^o-39^o API range. Iran has not had significant oil exploration activity in nearly 3 decades.

The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) recently has focused on frontier exploration efforts in the hopes of adding 1-2 billion barrels of proven reserves by 1999. NIOC's current five-year plan calls for drilling 37 onshore and 24 offshore Persian Gulf exploration wells by 2000. For the 1998 fiscal year, Iran has budgeted up to $6.3 billion in foreign financing for the oil and gas sectors. Part of this money will be used for exploration activities, included the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Since 1995, NIOC has made several sizable oil field discoveries. These include the Darkhoven oil field, which is located offshore Abadan and contains 2.5 billion barrels of low sulfur, 39^o API crude oil. NIOC hopes to start production from Darkhoven by 1999, with an initial production of 30,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) and a second phase peak of 60,000 bbl/d. Production goals are still uncertain, though, and further appraisal is required, as target reservoir depths are more than 15,000 feet. Near Ganaveh, NIOC also found two onshore oil fields holding combined reserves of 100 million barrels.

The Caspian Sea
Estimates of the Caspian Sea's proven and possible oil reserves reach as high as 191 billion barrels, with huge natural gas reserves as well. Since the break-up of the former Soviet Union, territorial issues have arisen regarding rights to the Caspian's resources. Iran's position is that treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 are still valid, implying that all countries bordering the Caspian must approve any offshore oil developments. In late February 1998, Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi reiterated Iran's position that any unilateral exploitation of Caspian Sea resources would be illegal. Oil Minister Zanganeh has stated that Iran backs national zones extending several miles from the coast and a "condominium" in the middle of the Sea. Iran also has stated (along with Russia) that it opposes laying an oil pipeline across the Caspian Sea floor.

Iran sees itself as a natural transit route for oil and gas exports from the landlocked Central Asian countries to world markets. This vision is complicated, however, by political considerations, particularly the U.S. policy opposing pipelines through Iran, the shortest (and most likely the least expensive) path to the open sea. As part of its attempt to isolate Iran and to contain its influence in the region, the United States has instead favored multiple routes for Caspian oil and gas through the Caucasus region to the Black sea or to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Criticism has surfaced among U.S.-based oil companies that U.S. sanctions are forcing American companies to opt for less preferable and accessible ways of moving oil and gas from the Caspian region to market. Unocal, for instance, has proposed building expensive, large-scale oil and natural gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through war-torn Afghanistan, instead of through Iran, because of sanctions, even though it believes a route through Iran would make more sense economically.

Currently, NIOC is exploring Iran's territorial waters in the Caspian Sea and has sought stakes in several of the various oil field development projects offshore Azerbaijan. Since 1995, Iran has been conducting a five-year exploration program of its sector of the Caspian Sea. However, exploration largely has been limited to shallow waters and primarily has resulted in marginal natural gas finds. In late 1996, National Iranian Drilling Company and Azerbaijan's SOCAR formed a joint venture company to conduct seismic surveys and drill exploratory wells in the Iranian sector of the Caspian. In February 1996, Turkmenistan invited Russia and Iran to conduct exploratory drilling in that country's Caspian Sea sector, where oil reserves are estimated at around 100 million barrels. In March 1998, NIOC said it would announce soon a new plan to explore an offshore Caspian area.

Crude Swaps
As part of its strategy to promote itself as an export route for oil and gas production from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, Iran has pushed so-called "swap" arrangements. In May 1996, Iran and Kazakhstan agreed to such an arrangement for Kazakh crude exports. The swap deal is for 10 years and involves about 70,000 bbl/d. Initial swaps began in December 1996 and involved shipments across the Caspian Sea of crude oil from the Tengiz, Kalamkas, and Karazhanbas fields, blended to produce a 32.5^o API gravity. This blend is comparable to the Iranian crude feedstock currently utilized at the 225,000-bbl/d Tehran and 112,000-bbl/d Tabriz refineries in northern Iran. In exchange for Kazakh crude supplied to northern Iranian refineries, Kazakhstan will have the option of lifting either Iranian Light or Iranian Heavy blend crude at Kharg Island. The swap agreement was temporarily put on hold in December 1997 due to high sulfur content and other "technical problems" with Kazakh crude.

Larger swap arrangements are possible in the future, with Iran claiming that it could handle 750,000 bbl/d in a short period of time, and possibly up to 1.5 MMBD eventually, in Caspian crude swaps. According to Iran, this would involve "not much investment" -- mainly in modifying existing pipelines linking the Tabriz and Tehran refineries with the Caspian coastal cities of Astara, Bandar Anzali, Rasht, Neka, and Gorgan. Modifications would entail a partial reversal of one or more product lines, implementation of a means to alternate between crude shipments south from Neka and product shipments north, or construction of a new crude line from either the Neka or Bandar Anzali ports to the Tehran or Tabriz refineries, respectively. (In early March 1998, plans were announced to expand a pipeline from Neka to the Tehran refinery.) Besides allowing for Caspian oil exports through Iran, swap arrangements would make sense for Iranian domestic purposes, since most of the country's oil is located in the south, far from major population centers and refineries in the north, meaning that large volumes of oil have to be pumped long distances across Iran. "Swaps" could help address this problem.

Production
Iran is OPEC's second largest oil producer, with an estimated 1997 oil output of 3.7 million bbl/d (MMBD), nearly all of which was crude oil. This compares to a current (1H98) OPEC crude oil production quota of 3.942 MMBD. Iran's current sustainable production capacity is estimated at around 4 MMBD, but this figure is controversial, with some claiming that Iran has maintained production levels at some older fields only by using methods which have permanently damaged the fields. In December 1997, Oil Minister Zanganeh stated that the country aimed to boost oil production capacity 200,000-250,000 bbl/d each year, possibly surpassing 6 MMBD by 2010. Some observers are skeptical about whether this goal, which would nearly restore the country's production capacity (over 6 MMBD) achieved in the mid-1970s, is possible. Iranian officials have estimated that the country will need to invest $90 billion in its oil industry over the next decade to avert a dramatic drop in oil production.

In late February 1998, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, on a 10-day trip to Saudi Arabia, stated that the Iran and Saudi Arabia had not yet reached agreement on oil policy. The two countries disagree over an OPEC strategy to reverse the decline in oil prices since OPEC decided in November 1997 to raise its production ceiling by 10%. Iran blames the decline on OPEC, while Saudi Arabia points to a combination of factors, including a warmer-than-normal winter in the northern Hemisphere, lower Asian oil demand, and OPEC overproduction.

Onshore Developments
In October 1997, Iran's Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh stated that Iran has plans in the near future to invite foreign company participation in onshore upstream oil and gas activities. This would mark a major policy shift -- namely, the return of foreign companies to Iran's onshore oil and gas fields since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

In contrast to Iran's efforts to bring new offshore fields online, NIOC's onshore field development work is concentrated mainly on sustaining output levels from large, aging fields. Consequently, a number of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) programs are underway at a number of fields. In addition, NIOC recently has brought several relatively small onshore fields online, including the 50,000-bbl/d Nargesi, 10,000-bbl/d Kilur Karim, and 5,000-bbl/d Karangan fields. Iran also is developing new reservoirs at fields such as Bibi Hakimeh, where deep formations at 13,000 feet have been proven to contain light, 37^o API crude oil.

Gas injection projects are expected to increase onshore capacity at least 300,000 bbl/d by 2000. Most of this increased capacity will come from the 570,000-bbl/d Marun, 130,000-bbl/d Karanj, and the presently inactive Parsi fields. These fields have been susceptible to water encroachment and have experienced severe pressure problems that have restricted oil production. Limited access to foreign investment has led to the use of local Iranian service companies for technical reservoir work at onshore fields. However, this has resulted in both financial and technical constraints, resulting in prolonged delays in capacity additions at fields like the 15-billion barrel (in-place) Parsi field. At the Karanj field, gas injection facilities were successfully installed in 1995, but expected output in the range of 225,000 bbl/d has failed to materialize. In early March 1998, President Khatami inaugurated a second phase of gas injection at Karanj, designed to boost recovered oil reserves by 1 billion barrels.

At other fields, EOR programs will require sizeable amounts of natural gas, infrastructure development, and financing. For example, gas injection programs at the 31-billion barrel (in-place), 150,000-bbl/d Agha Jari field, while leading to an increase in recoverable reserves of 4-5 billion barrels, could require 15 Tcf of gas during the field's remaining life. Gas-related EOR programs at Agha Jari, as well as at the Binak, Kupal, and Ramshahr fields, are dependent upon development of Iran's non-associated gas reserves in the South Pars and North Pars fields in the Persian Gulf. Independent sources estimate that NIOC's gas injection programs will require 100 Tcf.

Although NIOC has run into difficulties in implementing EOR programs at some of the fields mentioned above, it has been successful in many other cases. One example is NIOC's development work at Gachsaran, which contains in-place reserves of 53 billion barrels. The field currently has a gas injection capacity of 1.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), or almost 15% more than the field's present associated gas production. After a new, untapped, oil-bearing structure underlying existing producing formations is brought online, NIOC anticipates that production will be ramped up from 600,000 bbl/d to 750,000 bbl/d.

Offshore Developments
As of early 1998, Iran produced about 500,000 bbl/d of crude oil from eight operational offshore fields. This output level is the result of NIOC's extensive development and refurbishment efforts, which have boosted offshore capacity by about 150,000-200,000 bbl/d since 1993. The Doroud 1&2 (146,000 bbl/d), Salman, Abuzar, Forozan, and Sirri C&D fields comprise the bulk of Iran's offshore output, all of which is exported. Iran plans extensive development of existing offshore fields and hopes to raise its offshore production capacity to 1 MMBD by 2000. Estimates are that development of new offshore Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea oil fields will require investment of $8-$10 billion.

NIOC is actively seeking foreign investment to boost offshore oil and gas production, particularly at 12 new fields. Possible projects include developing the Balal oil field, renovating the war-damaged Soroush oil field, introducing gas injection at the Doroud field, and developing the Salman gas field's Dalan reservoir. NIOC has proposed that the projects be undertaken under a "buy-back" scheme, in which companies will be reimbursed for their investment through subsequent oil production. A new set of buy-back projects is scheduled to be offered after the Iranian New Year (March 21, 1998), including both onshore and offshore oil and gas fields, acreage in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and an opportunity to collect flared gas from oilfields in the Khuzestan region.

The 105-million barrel Balal field was discovered in the 1970s by an ARCO/Murphy consortium, but was nationalized along with the rest of Iran's offshore oil industry during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Balal was never developed even though an oil pipeline connecting the field to the Lavan Island export terminal was laid. Balal contains two reservoirs: a larger, shallow formation ("Arab/Hith") holding 42^o API crude; and a smaller, underlying zone ("Khatia") holding heavier 28^o API oil. In July 1997, Canada's Bow Valley Energy Ltd. signed an agreement to develop Dalal. Bow Valley is now conducting detailed engineering work, including a 3-D seismic survey, on the field. Initial production should begin in 1999 at 12,000-15,000 bbl/d, plateau at 40,000 bbl/d, and last around 15 years. Balal likely will require extensive water injection and other secondary recovery methods, especially in later years. In late January 1998, Bow Valley's Indonesian partner (Bakrie Minarak Petroleum Ltd.) informed Bow Valley officials that it would be unable to fulfill its $152 million obligation in the $212 million joint venture due to financial difficulties stemming from Indonesia's economic crisis. Bow Valley then began searching for another partner to keep the project going.

Soroush is located about 50 miles west of Kharg Island and contains estimated recoverable reserves of 400 million barrels. The field contains three reservoirs, two of which hold heavy 19^o API oil. It received heavy damage early in the Iran-Iraq War, and its 25,000 bbl/d production capacity has been shut-in by war damage since 1979. NIOC's $200-million development plan includes replacement of a 2.4-million barrel floating production, storage, and off-loading vessel (FPSO) and refurbishment of the field's main production platform and eight well protector platforms. NIOC projects that Soroush can be brought back online at an output level of 90,000 bbl/d.

Also near Kharg Island, NIOC is planning a $530-million gas re-injection scheme at the Doroud field. As of early 1998, Elf Aquitaine and Agip were reportedly the front-runners for this contract. The Doroud field currently produces 146,000 bbl/d (down from 170,000 bbl/d in 1997) and flares its associated gas output. Under the current plan, NIOC hopes to re-inject 400 Mmcf/d of gas, which will be acquired from Doroud and other regional fields, to increase the field's recoverable reserves by 600 million barrels and to raise oil output to 220,000 bbl/d or more.

Iran is planning to expand production facilities at the offshore Forozan field, located 60 miles northeast of Kharg Island. As of early 1997, NIOC was aiming to raise Forozan production from 50,000 bbl/d to 95,000 bbl/d by late 1997 and to recover associated gas from the field's large gas cap. NIOC also is taking measures to raise Abouzar field output. In late 1996, the field was producing 125,000 bbl/d. Abouzar's facilities were seriously damaged in the Iran-Iraq War.

In February 1996, Iran began producing 5,500 bbl/d from the Nowruz field, whose offshore facilities had been destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War. Currently, Iran's state-owned Oil Industries and Engineering Company (OIEC) is conducting feasibility studies on a possible upgrading program that could boost the field's output to 90,000 bbl/d by the end of 1998.

Total currently is developing the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. In June 1996, Petronas acquired a 30% stake in the project. Geophysical and 3-D seismic work conducted in mid-1996 resulted in an upgrading of the fields' reserves, which previously had been estimated at 436 million barrels of oil in Sirri E and 50 million barrels of oil in Sirri A. Combined reserves are now thought to reach between 730 million and 1 billion barrels. Sirri E is expected to come online in 1999. Combined, the two fields should reach a plateau of 124,000 bbl/d within five years (24,000 bbl/d at Sirri A and 100,000 bbl/d at Sirri E).

NIOC also would like to develop five oil and gas fields in the Hormuz region (Henjam A (HA), HB, HC, HD, and HE), the A field near Lavan Island, the Esfandir field near Kharg Island, and two structures near the South Pars gas field. According to NIOC, the five Henjam fields hold an estimated 400 million barrels of oil and have a production potential of 80,000 bbl/d.

Terminals
All Iranian onshore crude oil production and output from the Forozan field (which is blended with crude streams from the Abuzar and Dorood fields) is exported from the Kharg Island terminal located in the northern Gulf. The terminal's original capacity of 7 MMBD was nearly eliminated by more than 9,000 bombing raids during the Iran-Iraq War. Kharg Island's current export capacity is 5 MMBD, or double Iran's 1996 total crude oil exports of 2.5 MMBD. In addition, Iran installed four single buoy moorings at Ganeveh during the Iran-Iraq War. These have a combined capacity of 1 MMBD. Smaller amounts of offshore crude oil production from the southern Persian Gulf are exported from terminals on Lavan Island and Sirri Island. Iran also has unused terminals at Cyrus and Ras Bahregan in the southern Gulf. In June 1995, the 60,000-dwt capacity Abadan product terminal was re-opened after having been shut-in since the Iran-Iraq War.

Crude Oil Marketing/Sales
Iran exported about 2.4 MMBD in 1997, mainly Iranian Heavy (31^o API) and Iranian Light (34^o API) blends. Iranian Light exports slowed in 1997, and Iran attempted to shift term customers onto Iranian Heavy. Smaller blended crude streams come from the Lavan, Sirri, and Forozan area fields. In early 1998, Iran's core Asian customers (Japan and South Korea) were purchasing less oil than normal from Iran, possibly due to the Asian economic crisis. In response, Iran was increasing its marketing efforts in Europe, Latin America, and South Africa. Iran also aims to increase sales to China's burgeoning oil import market in coming years.

In December 1996, NITC acquired its fifth and final 300,000-dwt tanker from South Korea's Daewoo. These tankers will complement NITC's existing fleet of six very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and will allow NITC flexibility in marketing Iranian crude. Prior to the arrival of the South Korean vessels, NITC had only one tanker in active service. The remaining five vessels continue to be used as floating storage vessels for offshore Iranian loading terminals in the Persian Gulf. In January 1997, an NITC official stated that the company plans soon to offer a tender for construction of another five takers.

In July 1995, South Africa agreed to allow Iran to store up to 15 million barrels at the 45-million barrel Saldanha Bay crude oil storage facility near Cape Town. In January 1996, however, South Africa's Central Energy Fund reported that an environmental study designed to assess the impact of storing Iranian oil in South Africa would be delayed by six months until September 1996. In late 1996, the South African government announced that extensive environmental studies would have to be undertaken before the storage deal could move forward. Since no firm timetables have been established for the completion of these studies, the Saldanha Bay storage deal is likely to be delayed indefinitely. The deal would have enabled Iran to store crude exports closer to its South American and European markets. It also would have served to facilitate supplies to two South African refineries in Durban, which lifted about 200,000 bbl/d of Iranian crude in 1995.

Crude Oil Refining
As of early 1998, Iran had eight operational refineries with a combined nameplate capacity of 1.36 MMBD. In order to meet burgeoning domestic demand for middle and light distillates, Iran has imported refined products since 1982. While these product imports reached more than 150,000 bbl/d in 1994, they have since subsided due to debottlenecking work at the Isfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Lavan refineries during the past couple of years. In late 1996, Iran was importing about 50,000 bbl/d of light products, while at the same time, exporting fuel oil and other heavy products.

With the long-awaited start-up of the new 232,000-bbl/d Bandar Abbas refinery, which is located near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran hopes to generate annual product exports of $1.75 billion. Originally budgeted at $1.6 billion at the commencement of construction in 1990, it is now estimated that Iran has spent $3.3 billion on the refinery. Bandar Abbas is being supplied mainly with heavy crude from Kharg Island and with smaller amounts of condensate from the nearby Sarkhoon field.

Iran optimistically hopes to boost its refining capacity to almost 2 MMBD by 1999. Two planned grassroots refineries include a 225,000-bbl/d plant at Shah Bahar and a 120,000-bbl/d unit on Qeshm Island. The $3-billion Shahbahar refinery project was approved by the government in late 1994 and would be built by private investors. The $1.8-billion Qeshm Island refinery project is to be built by Swiss company Super Petroleum. In early March 1998, the Iranian Construction minister stated that an Iranian company was considering building an oil refinery in Bangladesh. Iran also has discussed possible cooperation on refinery venture with Pakistan and the Philippines.

Petrochemicals
Oil Minister Zanganeh has stated that development of the country's petrochemical industry is a priority. Petrochemical production would add value to Iran's huge oil and gas reserves (and exports). The State-owned National Petrochemical Co. (NPC) has launched a $24 billion development program aimed at boosting the contribution of petrochemicals in the Iranian economy four-fold (from 1% to 4%) by 2020. Iran has concluded that this effort, which would involve construction of 30 new plants with total capacity of 21 million tons per year (Mmt/y), will require large-scale foreign investment. Currently, Iran remains dependent on imports for a number of petrochemical products, especially plastics. The new plants would produce large quantities of olefins, aromatics, methanol, and fertilizers. Bandar Imam, on the Persian Gulf, is to serve as the location for 22 of the projects, while the other 8 projects will be located near consuming areas in Iran.

With the February 1997 start-up of the $2.3-billion, 650,000-ton/year Tabriz facility, Iran now has 11 petrochemical complexes with a combined production capacity of close to 13 Mmt/y. Iran aims to expand the country's production capacity to 16 Mmt/y by 2000 and over 30 Mmt/y by 2020. Iran's current expansion program entails construction of 12 new petrochemical facilities by 2001. Projects expected to be completed by 2000 include 660,000-ton/year methanol and 50,000-ton/year acetic acid units at Kharg Island, a 295,000-ton/year purified terephthalic acid (PTA) and poly-ethylene terephthalate (PET) plant at Bandar Imam, a 660,000-ton/year methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) plant at Bandar Imam, an olefins plant at Bandar Imam, and a polycarbonates plant at Isfahan. In the fall of 1997, NPC was given the go-ahead to declare Bandar Imam a special petrochemical economic zone to help attract foreign investors.

Meanwhile, moves to privatize NPC have been expected since the appointment of Mohammed Reza Nematzadeh as managing director in September 1997. On March 11, 1998, Nematzadeh said that three petrochemical companies (beginning with the Persian Gulf Kharg Petrochemicals Co.) would be listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in April 1998. Nematzadeh also stated Iran's goal to increase petrochemical exports to Europe. Currently, about half of Iran's petrochemical exports go to Asian countries. Iran's petrochemical plans are in competition with a wave of development underway throughout the Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia, for instance, accounts for 56% of Middle East petrochemical output, compared to Iran's 13% share. Iran currently exports about 55% of its total petrochemical product output, and aims to increase this to 70% over the next 5-6 years.

NATURAL GAS
Iran contains an estimated 810 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves -- the world's second largest and surpassed only by those found in Russia. The bulk of Iranian gas reserves are located in non-associated fields. However, large onshore oil fields contains approximately 120 Tcf of associated gas, which is either dissolved in crude or is in gas caps.

Iran's largest non-associated gas is the South Pars field, which is an extension of Qatar's 241-Tcf North Field. South Pars was first identified in 1988 and originally appraised at 128 Tcf in the early 1990s. However, NIOC-sponsored studies conducted in mid-1996 indicate that South Pars contains an estimated 328 Tcf, of which a large fraction will be recoverable, and at least 3 billion barrels of condensate. Iran's other sizable non-associated gas reserves include the offshore 47-Tcf North Pars gas field (a separate structure from South Pars), the onshore Nar-Kangan fields, the 13-Tcf Aghar and Dalan fields in Fars province, and the Sarkhoun and Mand fields.

In 1996, Iran produced about 2.6 Tcf of natural gas. Of this amount, 1.3 Tcf was marketed, 1 Tcf was re-injected, and 0.3 Tcf was flared. In 1990, Iran undertook an ongoing gas utilization program that is designed to boost production to 10 Tcf per year by 2010, reduce flaring, provide gas for EOR re-injection programs, and allow for increased gas exports abroad.

The dual Aghar-Dalan field development has been one of National Iranian Gas Company's (NIGC) recent successful gas utilization projects. After coming online in mid-1995, the Aghar and Dalan fields produce approximately 600 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) and 800 Mmcf/d, respectively. Gas from both fields is processed at a $300-million gas processing facility at the Dalan field, which is also the location of a 40-megawatt, gas-fired power plant. Most of the treated gas from the Dalan processing plant is carried through a 212-mile pipeline for re-injection in the Marun field and other oil fields in Khuzestan province.

New Field Development Projects
On September 29, 1997, Total signed a $2 billion deal (along with Russia's Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas) to explore South Pars and to help develop the field during Phase 2 and 3 of its development. This move represents a serious challenge to U.S. efforts aimed at containing Iran, and specifically risks triggering U.S. sanctions under ILSA. The Total deal represents the first big venture between Iran and foreign firms since ILSA came into force in August 1996. Iran hopes that the Total deal is the sign of more such deals to come. Shell, for instance, is studying later stages of South Pars development, but is carefully watching U.S. reaction to Total's deal. As of early March 1998, the U.S. State Department was still considering whether or not to recommend that President Clinton impose sanctions on Total (and its partners) for this deal. One question is whether or not a planned Gazprom bond offer underwritten by Goldman, Sachs & Co. is subject to sanctions.

NIOC estimates that South Pars has a gas production potential of up to 8 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) from four individual reservoirs. The company has a three-phased development for South Pars. Phase I, currently scheduled for completion by the end of 2000, involves production of 1 Bcf/d of natural gas and 40,000 bbl/d of condensate, and is being carried out by the Petroleum Development and Engineering Company (PEDEC), an affiliate of NIOC. A recently-revised funding plan for Phase I South Pars development taps revenues from the sale of crude oil from the Sirri A and E fields.

In March 1997, Iranian Oil Minister Gholamreza Aghazadeh stated that the three-phase South Pars development would proceed concurrently, with the three phases combined yielding 3 Bcf/d of gas, 120,000 bbl/d of condensate, and $3.5 billion a year in revenues when completed in 2001 or 2002. NIOC is developing Phase 1 of the overall project, while Total's consortium is responsible for Phases 2 and 3. Shell reportedly has held discussions about an export plan for gas from South Pars. Production from South Pars is to be transported "wet" to the onshore As Saluyeh gas treatment plant 100 km away. The gas is intended for domestic use in power plants and for enhanced oil recovery. South Pars is expected to produce $35-$40 billion worth of gas over a 30-year period.

Besides South Pars, Iran aims to develop the 6.4-Tcf, non-associated Khuff (Dalan) reservoir of the Salman oil field. Salman straddles Iran's maritime border with Abu Dhabi, where it is known as the Abu Koosh field. NIOC is seeking to develop the Khuff reservoir, which could lead to the production of 500 Mmcf/d of non-associated gas, along with the 120,000 bbl/d of crude oil that is now being produced from a shallower reservoir. Salman gas could either be exported to Dubai's Jebel Ali or to domestic locations at Qeshm Island and Badar Mogham. The project cost is estimated at slightly under $600 million for a two platform development.

The 48-Tcf North Pars development will be integral to Iran's long-term gas utilization plans. In early 1994, Shell completed a feasibility study on the field. Development plans call for 3.6 Bcf/d of gas production, of which 1.2 Bcf/d would be re-injected into the onshore Gachsaran, Bibi Hakimeh, and Binak oil fields. The other 2.4 Bcf/d would be sent to the more mature Agha Jari oil field. However, Shell's negotiations on the field have been stalled since 1995.

In early 1997, Iran and Oman agreed to joint development of the Henjam E (HE) field, which shares the same geological structure as Oman's Bukha West field. HE/Bukha West contains an estimated 1.15 Tcf of natural gas and about 80 million barrels of condensate. Production terms will be on an 80:20 basis, in favor of Iran. Two discovery wells have been drilled on the joint structure, in HE in the 1970s and in Bukha West in the 1980s. Eventual production could be tied to Oman's Bukha gas field farther south. The HE field will possibly be offered to private investors under NIOC's proposed second round of buy-back contracts.

Natural Gas Exports
Although domestic gas consumption is growing rapidly, Iran continues to promote export markets for its natural gas. Under current plans, NIOC optimistically hopes to export 450 Mmcf/d of gas by 2000, rising to 4,000 Mmcf/d by 2005 as its larger, more ambitious projects come online. By 2000, NIOC plans to have completed three gas export pipelines to Turkey, Armenia, and Nakhichevan. By 2005, two more lines to Europe and India are planned, in addition to the possibility of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility for LNG exports to Asia. Implementation of these ambitious plans will require substantial international financing and support, both lacking at present. Iran also hopes to serve as a major transit center for gas exports from Central Asia.

Turkey
In August 1996, Iran signed a $20-billion, 22-year gas supply deal with Turkey. Initial gas deliveries of 300 Mmcf/d are expected to begin in 1999, with later supplies climbing to near 1 Bcf/d. The supply contract will require construction of four new pipelines. As of January 1997, design and engineering work had been completed for the first link between the Iranian Gas Trunkline (IGAT 1) terminus at Tabriz and Bazargan on the Turkish border. On the Turkish side, state-owned Botas recently began the bidding process for construction of a 200-mile, 40-inch link between Dogubeyazit and Erzurum. In April 1997, Botas also requested bids for a 252-mile link between Erzurum and Sivas as well as a connecting 288-mile pipeline between Sivas and Ankara. Iranian gas used to supply the pipeline will come from the non-associated Kangan regional fields as well as from associated sources around Ahwaz.

This deal has brought criticism from the United States, which views the deal as supporting the present Iranian regime. However, Turkey has steadfastly maintained that it needs to diversify its suppliers of natural gas and that Iranian gas is one of its most economically sound alternatives. In October 1997, following replacement of Turkey's Islamist Welfare Party, Turkish officials hinted that the deal was on hold. Iranian officials deny this. Meanwhile, Turkey has signed a $3 billion dollar deal to buy large volumes of gas from Turkmenistan (possibly via Iran) beginning in 2000.

Armenia
In mid-1995, Iran signed a renewable, 15-year deal to supply 100 Mmcf/d of gas to Armenia. This agreement requires construction of a new $135-million pipeline link that connects to IGAT 1. Construction of the line is proceeding, and first gas exports are expected to occur by 1999. The Iranian gas will be used to supply a new, jointly constructed power plant on the Aras river.

Pakistan/India
Iran increasingly is targeting Asian emerging markets like Pakistan and India (rather than Japan and South Korea) for LNG exports. In January 1995, Iran and Pakistan signed a preliminary agreement for construction of a $3-billion, 870-mile, 1.6-Bcf/d onshore gas export pipeline linking South Pars with Karachi, Pakistan. Subsequently, a proposed extension to India led to security-of-supply concerns for the Indian government. As of February 1998, a consortium of Shell, British Gas, Petronas, and an Iranian business group known as the "Foundation for the Deprived and the War Disabled" reportedly was negotiating to export gas from South Pars to Pakistan.

Turkmenistan/Europe
In December 1997, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey signed an agreement with Shell for a nine-month feasibility study into the possibility of constructing a natural gas pipeline which would eventually link Turkmenistan to Turkey (and beyond) via Iran. The $1.6-billion, 930-mile long pipeline initially would carry 105 Bcf of gas per year.

In early March 1998, the first natural gas began flowing through a relatively small, $195-million, 125-mile pipeline from Turkmenistan's southern Korpedzhe gas field to Kurt-Kuyi, Iran. The line, inaugurated on December 29, 1997, was financed by NIOC (80%) and the Turkmen government (20%). Initial capacity is 141 billion cubic feet per year, expected to double by 2006. Both Iran and Turkmenistan hope that this small initial line will eventually be part of a much larger regional gas pipeline network. Turkmenistan initially will sell its gas to Iran at a price of $40 per thousand cubic meters ($1.13 per thousand cubic feet).

ELECTRICITY
Iran hopes to raise its electrical generating capacity from 25,000 megawatts (MW) at present to 30,000-MW by 2000. Hydroelectric generation will play an important role in this expansion, with hydro capacity nearly doubling to 5,000 MW after construction of a dozen new dams during the next several years. The largest hydro project on tap is the 2,000-MW Godar-e Landar dam, scheduled for completion by 2001.

A number of new power plants have come online recently in Iran, including the Mitsubishi-built, 2,000-MW Shahid Rajai thermal power station in Qazvin, a 1,290-MW combined-cycle plant in Rasht, and a doubling of the Tabriz power plant's capacity to 1,500 MW.

Iran is continuing to rely on sizable foreign investment for a number of its currently ongoing power projects. These include Kraftwerk Union's (a Siemens' subsidiary) $1.4-billion, 2,080-MW combined-cycle plant in southern Iran. Other foreign companies active in Iranian power sector projects include Canada's Babcock & Wilcox, French-British GEC-Alsthom, Switzerland-based ABB Asea Brown Boveri, and Italy's Nuoca Cimimontubi and Belleli. In January 1998, Iran's Deputy Energy Minister said that Iran would welcome European and U.S. private investors to participate in the planned privatization of the country's power generation industry. Breaking up the state power generation monopoly (Tavir) into competing private companies and reducing large state subsidies are two important proposed measures aimed at increasing electric generation and transmission efficiency, reducing an estimated $4 billion in wasted electricity, and attracting foreign investment.

Nuclear
On October 3, 1997, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency (Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the former Oil Minister) announced that Iran would pursue a plan aimed at meeting 20% of the country's electricity demand through nuclear power. Aghazadeh said that the government had decided to build a second 1,000-megawatt (MW) unit at the Bushehr nuclear power complex as soon as work is completed on the current unit being built by the Russians. Aghazadeh further said that Iran was discussing further nuclear power plant deals with Russia and China.

Currently, Iran has five small nuclear reactors, one in Tehran and four in Isfahan. Iran claims that its nuclear power is for peaceful purposes and that it will help free up oil and gas resources for export, thus generating additional hard-currency revenues. On February 23, 1998, the U.S. State Department reaffirmed U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The United States has argued that Iran has sufficient oil and gas reserves for power generation, and that nuclear reactors are expensive, unnecessary, and could be used for military purposes. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Work on Bushehr had begun in 1974, but was halted (80% complete) following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In January 1995, progress on Bushehr resumed when Russia signed a $780-million contract to complete power plant. The Russian deal calls for completion of the two 1,300-MW pressurized-light water units as well as possible supply of two modern VVER-440 units. The United States strongly opposes the project, and has in the past provided Russia with intelligence information pointing to the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Despite this, the Russians appear to be proceeding with work on Bushehr, with some estimates that the plant could be completed by 2000. On March 6, 1998, during a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ukraine announced that it would not sell turbines for use with reactors at Bushehr. The contract had been worth $45 million. Five days later, Vice President Gore met with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and discussed, among other things, U.S. concerns over Russian exports of nuclear and missile technology to Iran.

COUNTRY OVERVIEW
President: Mohammed Khatami (since August 1997)
Supreme/Spiritual Leader: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Chairman of the Expediency Council: Hashemi Rafsanjani
Independence: April 1, 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed) (note: in 1502 a native dynasty reasserted full independence after several centuries of rule by the Mongols and Turks)
Population (7/97E): 67.5 million
Location/Size: Middle East - between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea/636,296 square miles
Major Cities: Tehran (capital), Meshed, Isfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, Ahwaz, Kermanshah, Qom, Ardebil, Qazvin
Languages: Persian and Persian dialects (58%), Turkic and Turkic dialects (26%), Kurdish (9%), Luri (2%), Baluch (1%), Arabic (1%), Turkish (1%), other (2%)
Ethnic Groups: Persian (51%), Azerbaijani (24%), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), Kurd (7%), Arab (3%), Lur (2%), Baluch (2%), Turkmen (2%), other (1%)
Religion: Shi'a Muslim (89%), Sunni Muslim (10%), Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i (1%)
Defense (8/96): Army (345,000), Revolutionary Guard (120,000), Navy (18,000), Air Force (30,000), army reserves (350,000)

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Currency: Rial (R)
Exchange Rates (11/97): R1750 per $U.S. for official budget transactions and essential goods imports and exports, as well as external debt service; R3000 per $U.S. for other imports and exports
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(1997E): $91.3 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1997E): 3.4% (1998E): 2.3%
Inflation Rate (1998E): 20%-25%
Current Account Balance (1996E): $7.2 billion
Major Trading Partners: Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Turkey, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain
Merchandise Exports (1998E): $21.4 billion
Merchandise Imports (1998E): $16.2 billion
Major Export Products: Petroleum and related products, carpets, pistachios
Major Import Products: Machinery, military equipment, metals, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, refined oil products, technical services
Oil Export Revenues (3/97-3/98): $17.7 billion
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (1997E): 80%-85%
Total External Debt (1997E): $14-$30 billion

ENERGY OVERVIEW
Minister of Energy: Habibollah Bitaraf
Minister of Oil: Bijan Namdar Zanganeh
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/98): 93 billion barrels
Oil Production (1997E): 3.66 million barrels per day (MMBD)
OPEC Crude Oil Production Quota (1H98): 3.94 MMBD
Sustainable Oil Production Capacity (1998E): 3.7-4.0 MMBD
Oil Consumption (1997E): 1.2 MMBD
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/98): 1.36 MMBD
Net Oil Exports (1997E): 2.4 MMBD
Major Crude Oil Customers (12/97): Japan, South Korea, UnitedKingdom, China, Turkey, Thailand, India, Brazil, Taiwan
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/98): 810 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
Natural Gas Production (1996E): 1.4 Tcf
Natural Gas Consumption (1996E): 1.4 Tcf
Coal Production (1996E): 1.1 million short tons (Mmst)
Coal Consumption (1996E): 1.5 Mmst
Net Coal Imports (1996E): 0.4 Mmst
Electric Generation Capacity (1/1/96E): 26 gigawatts
Electricity Production (1996E): 79.5 billion kilowatthours

ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW
Total Energy Consumption (1996E): 4.0 quadrillion Btu
Energy Consumption per Capita (1996E): 66 million Btu (vs. 351.9 in the U.S.)
Energy Consumption per $1987 of GDP (1996E): 20.6 thousand Btu (vs. 16.7 thousand Btu in U.S.)
Energy-related Carbon Emissions (1996E): 72.9 million metric tons (1.2% of world carbon emissions)
Carbon Emissions per thousand $1987 of GDP (1996E): 0.37 metric tons (vs. 0.26 metric tons in U.S.)
Carbon Emissions per Capita (1996E): 1.2 metric tons (vs. 5.53 metric tons in the U.S.)
Major Environmental Issues: Deforestation, water and air pollution, water shortages

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES
Organizations: National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) - oil and gas exploration and production, refining and oil transportation; National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) - manages gathering, treatment, processing, transmission, distribution, and exports of gas and gas liquids; National Petrochemical Company (NPC) - handles petrochemical production, distribution, and exports.
Major Foreign Oil Company Involvement: Gazprom, Petronas, Shell, Total
Major Oil Fields (unproven reserves-bill. barrels)(1995E): Gachsaran (53), Marun (52), Ahwaz Bangestan (47), Agha Jari (31), Rag-e-Safid (22), Parsi (15), Bibi Hakimeh (15)
Major Producing Oil Fields (production, bbl/d)(1995): Ahwaz Asmari (700,000), Gachsaran (600,000), Marun (570,000), Agha Jari (250,000), Doroud 1&2 (170,000), Rag-e Safid (150,000), Bibi Hakimeh (150,000), Ahwaz Bangestan (140,000), Karanj (130,000), Salman (105,000)
Major Refineries (capacity, bbl/d): Abadan (400,000), Isfahan (265,000), Tehran (225,000), Arak (150,000), Tabriz (112,000), Shiraz (40,000), Kermanshah (30,000), Lavan (20,000) (Note: the new 232,000-bbl/d Bandar Abbas refinery came online in mid-1997, although only at half-capacity utilization)
Major Oil Terminals: Ganaveh, Kharg Island, Lavan Island, Sirri Island, Cyrus, Ras Bahregan, Larak Island
Gas Pipeline System: IGAT-1 transports associated gas from Khuzestan area oilfields to consumption centers in the north; IGAT-2 transports non-associated gas from the Kangan and Nar fields on the Persian Gulf coast near Bandar Taheri; IGAT-3, which wold run from South Pars to Tehran, is planned
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Links to other sites:
1996 CIA World Factbook - Iran
U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
U.S. State Department's Consular Information Sheet - Iran
Library of Congress Country Study on Iran
U.S Policy Towards Iran

The following links are provided solely as a service to our customers, and therefore should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any position of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the United States Government. In addition, EIA does not guarantee the content or accuracy of any information presented in linked sites.

WebIran Home Page
The Center for Middle Eastern Studies - Iran
Iran Online
Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, DC (in the Pakistani Embassy)
Iran Business Resources

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File last modified: March 19, 1998

Contact:

Lowell Feld
lfeld@eia.doe.gov
Phone: (202)586-9502
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